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 Chapter 4 
 Emigration from Italy After the Crisis: 
The Shortcomings of the Brain Drain 
Narrative 
 Guido  Tintori and  Valentina  Romei 
 In this chapter, we try to assess whether the international economic crisis, which 
stemmed from the credit crunch of 2007–2008 originated in the United States and 
the United Kingdom, has had a signifi cant impact on Italy’s migratory patterns. 
According to offi cial statistics, Italy has steadily had a positive net migration since 
1974, thus turning into a ‘country of immigration’, after a long-standing status of a 
‘country of emigration’. This turn in Italy’s migratory balance should not convey 
the idea, though, that there have not been relatively signifi cant numbers of people 
leaving the country even after the 1970s (Tintori  2013 : 127–133). In our analysis, 
we focus our attention primarily on outfl ows from Italy towards Northern Europe, 
testing the conventional assumption that the country, in a sort of path dependent 
response, recurred to emigration as a viable remedy to economic strain and as a 
safety valve to release the social pressure of high level of unemployment. In the fi rst 
part of the chapter, we initially consider the evolution of the fi nancial, economic and 
social conditions of the country from the 1990s to 2015. We then provide a brief 
historical review of the migratory fl ows from and to Italy for the same period. This 
basic overview of the interaction of the economic crisis and Italy’s migratory pat-
terns works as a background to discuss more specifi c questions concerning current 
emigration: its scale, compared to past experiences; its composition, with special 
attention paid to the level of professional skills, sex and age; the reliability of avail-
able data. To describe in detail the socio-demographic profi le of the Italian emi-
grants since the 2000s and their destinations we rely on Italian data collected by the 
ministries of the Interior and Foreign Affairs, as well as by the National statistical 
offi ce (ISTAT). We critically assess the accuracy of such data against the available 
statistical sources from the top destination countries. In the second part of the 
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chapter, we analyse both the public discourse on and the policy response to the most 
recent outfl ows. In particular, we look at how the political elites discursively framed 
the relationship between the crisis and the outfl ows and to what extent the most 
recent outfl ows intertwine with the latest labour market reforms. In conclusion, we 
fact-check whether the hegemonic narrative focusing on the ‘brain drain’ is consis-
tent with the data on the human capital of those who have left and might leave. 
4.1  A Quantitative Approach to Crisis-Induced Emigration 
from Italy 
4.1.1  Current Economic and Social Situation 
 Since the 1990s, the Italian economy has been suffering from a long period of slug-
gish or no growth. After 2007, Italy faced a series of dip recessions, which resulted 
in a rapid deterioration of the quality of life of her population. 
 The reasons behind the country’s poor economic performance since the 1990s 
are numerous and controversial ranging from its public debt, a sclerotic bureau-
cracy, low productivity rates and falling competitiveness – mainly linked to rela-
tively high unit labour costs, excessive regulation, lack of R&D spending, an excess 
of small sized businesses -, political instability, ineffi ciency, corruption and uncom-
petitive marketable services (Ciocca  2007 : Ch. 12 & 13). The 2008 international 
crisis, therefore, hit Italy in a peculiar way, compared to other Eurozone countries, 
making recovery less a question of cutting expenses and bailing out the fi nancial 
and bank system, than a demand for far-reaching structural reforms of the public 
sector and the business environment (Ciocca  2010 ). The international crisis of 2008 
aggravated, if anything, the political and economic instability Italy has been strug-
gling with since the early 1990s. 
 While all the Eurozone had a double digit growth in the last 15 years, the Italian 
economy did not grow at all. It grew very slowly even in the fi rst half of 2000 when 
the Spanish economy, for example, rose by 17 %. After the crisis, even though Italy 
avoided any bank bailouts and the direct intervention of the European Commission 
(EC), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) – the so-called ‘Troika’— the country’s recovery has been very weak. 
Compared to the same period in 2008, Italy’s economy still shrank the most among 
both core countries – France, the UK and Germany – and some peripheral countries, 
including Spain, in the second quarter of 2015. Italy’s was the only one to contract 
in 2014 among major European economies, and in the fi rst half of 2015 it grew at 
half the speed of the average of the Eurozone. In the 2 years to the second quarter 
of 2015 the Italian GDP rose by a meagre 0.4 %, while the UK gained 5.7 %. 
Whatever the main reasons of “steady and prolonged decline in growth” (Tiffi n 
 2013 : 3) the consequences included lost of employment, productivity, output, sav-
ings, impoverishment of its population and lack of confi dence. 
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 Unemployment levels started to slowly decline in 2015 but, at just below 12 % of 
the population, they still are close to the all-time high since the 1960s. Both the EC 
and the IMF forecast the level to remain above the country long-term average until 
2020. In Italy the level of unemployment is still much lower than in other Southern 
European countries – in Spain and Greece it varies between 22 % and 25 % – but it 
also hides a more general deterioration of the labour market (Ballestrero  2012 ; 
Carinci  2012 ). As in Italy it is relatively diffi cult to dismiss employees, especially 
in the public sector, there has been an increase of poor quality employment and 
unemployment among the most vulnerable groups, like the youth. According to 
Eurostat ( 2015 ) Italy’s youth unemployment reached 41 % in August 2015, the third 
largest in the Eurozone after Greece (48 %) and Spain (49 %). Both youth and total 
unemployment rates are higher among the female population. The crisis resulted in 
a narrowing of the gender gap in employment rates among all advanced countries. 
In Italy, this kind of convergence takes place at a slower pace, in that a higher pro-
portion of women in working age were inactive, mainly because of a lack of job 
opportunities and rewarding careers. This is particularly worrying, as according to 
OECD nearly half of the Italian female population (45 %) is inactive, the third larg-
est proportion after Turkey and Mexico. The same source shows that Italy has the 
second largest proportion among advanced countries after Chile for marginally 
attached workers, i.e. people not in the labour force because they were too discour-
aged to look for jobs, but willing and available to work. It also ranks third among 
advanced economies after Spain and the Slovak Republic for proportion of people 
that are working part-time because they could not fi nd a full time job. 
 Over 25 % of total employees in Italy are self-employed, the second highest pro-
portion in Western Europe after Greece. The fi gure is, to some extent, infl ated by the 
fact that many self-employed are de facto working full time for a different employer, 
since there is a lower tax wedge for independent contractors. Still, self-employment 
can also be seen as a survival strategy for those who cannot fi nd any other means of 
earning an income. Those who do fi nd jobs are employed with largely precarious 
contracts. According to the OECD more than half of the youth (15–24 years old) 
were in temporary contracts in 2014. Despite the current government’s claims on 
the positive impact of the recently approved “jobs act”, only one third of the new 
contracts registered between January and July 2015 were permanent. 1 On the other 
side, those that are unemployed tend to be so for a long period with the risk of hav-
ing rising diffi culties in re-entering the labour market. Nearly 60 % of the unem-
ployed in Italy have been so for more than 1 year, the fi fth largest among OECD 
countries and a rapid rise from 49 % before the crisis. 
 The result is that real disposable income has been rapidly deteriorating and it is 
now at lower levels than in the early 1990s, while it is over 60 % higher in the 
Eurozone. The deterioration of the labour market, in fact, is much more evident 
from data on poverty rather than from unemployment rates. According to Eurostat, 
1  Source:  http://www.inps.it/bussola/VisualizzaDOC.aspx?sVirtualURL=/docallegati/DatiEBilanci
/osservatori/Documents/Osservatorio_Precariato_Gen-Lug2015.pdf&iIDDalPortale=10156 . 
Accessed 1 October 2015. 
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the percentage of the population that is severely deprived is much higher in Italy 
than in other Western European countries (11.5 % in 2014 vs. 7.1 % in Spain and 
5 % in France and Germany). The percentage declined from its peak at 14 % in 
2012, but it’s still double than the pre-crisis period (Eurostat  2013 ). 
4.1.2  Migratory Dynamics Before and During the Economic 
Crisis 
 Since the 2000s, Italy, together with Greece, Spain and the United Kingdom, has 
been one of the main immigrant-receiving countries in Europe (OECD  2011 : 403–
404). The international economic crisis has, of course, impacted on Italy’s migra-
tory dynamics. The country still attracts signifi cant numbers of immigrants, mainly 
because the backbone of its productive system, made of small and medium enter-
prises, is in labour-intensive sectors, like fashion, agriculture and food. Italy thus 
continues to present a positive net migration, even though the gap between those 
who enter and those who leave the country every year has been shrinking, especially 
since 2011. Total immigration into the country, i.e. including Italian returnees, went 
from roughly 527,000 individuals at its peak in 2007 to almost 307,000 in 2013. 
Despite this decrease, yet offi cial data show that the net international migration 
amounted to considerable +142,000 units in 2014, +182,000 in 2013 and +245,000 in 
2012. On the other hand, total emigration, i.e. including foreigners leaving the 
country, for the same period has doubled, passing from nearly 51,000 in 2007 to 
over 139,000 in 2014 (ISTAT  2015 ,  2014 ). 
 Focussing on Italian citizens only, there is a clear growing trend of Italian nation-
als moving their residency abroad. The 2014 and 2013 fi gures – respectively, 89,000 
and 82,000 – are the highest in the last 10 years (ISTAT  2014 ,  2015 ). The net migra-
tion of Italian citizens has been negative already for most of the 1990s and 2000s but 
since 2009 the gap is widening. Nonetheless, according to ISTAT, the number of 
Italian emigrants has not reached yet the levels of the 1970s. 
 High rates of returns, a typical trait of historical emigration from Italy, are a fea-
ture of more recent emigration patterns too. 2 The numbers of Italians returning to 
their home country, though, are lower than they used to. For example, the non- 
foreign population that moved to Italy from abroad in 2012 was 20 % lower than in 
2007. In the 5 years to 2012, 28,000 Italian nationals moved to Italy from Germany, 
the same number in the previous 5 years was over 51,000. Over the same period, 
Italians returning from Switzerland dropped from 24,000 to 13,000. According to 
Eurostat, in 2012 Italy had the smallest share of returning migrants among all 
European countries (excluding Cyprus and Luxemburg). 
 The foreign population residing in Italy is increasingly leaving the country. Over 
11,000 Romanians – the largest foreign-born national group in Italy – left the 
2  For a thorough discussion of past Italian emigrations – destinations, volumes, patterns (return or 
settlement) and political contexts – see (Tintori  2013 ). 
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 country in 2013 together with nearly 2400 Moroccans and a similar number of 
Albanians. At the same time, the annual infl ow of the same groups is declining. It 
needs also to be considered that documented immigrants leaving the country have 
no incentives – just as natives – to de-register as residents in Italy, since it would 
involve loosing some benefi ts there, such as access to welfare service and public 
health care. For example, while ISTAT counted about 1500 Albanians leaving Italy 
in 2011, the Albanian statistics registered nearly 7000 Albanian returnees from Italy 
for the same year. The explanation in the mismatch of the two data, apart from pos-
sible differences in collecting them, lies also in the above-mentioned reason. 
4.1.3  Main Trends in the Current Emigration 
 As everyone who has familiarity with the collection of data on international mobil-
ity knows, it is diffi cult to say exactly how many people are leaving or entering Italy 
every year. Undocumented immigration is a known problem, but undetected emi-
gration is also an issue. Italians living abroad have a legal obligation to register in 
the AIRE (Registry of the Italian citizens residing abroad) at consulates, provided 
they have the intention of staying in that country for at least 12 month. There are no 
real incentives to register, since failure to comply with the law is not sanctioned and, 
once registered into the AIRE, the citizens lose a series of benefi ts in the home 
country, such as their access to the health service of their region of last residence, to 
name one. In addition, most people might not know for how long they are going to 
stay abroad, especially when they move to another EU member state with temporary 
contracts or as jobseekers. Therefore, Italians abroad register only when they are in 
need of a service from the consulate, typically, after quite some time. Therefore, 
AIRE fi gures are, on the one hand, very likely to underestimate the presence of 
Italian workers abroad, especially when their stay is temporary. Despite that, the 
most recent data of the AIRE show that the stock of citizens offi cially residing 
abroad has increased impressively in the last decade and totalled more than 4.5 mil-
lion nationals at the end of 2014 (see Fig.  4.1 ). Yet, according to AIRE data less than 
one in four Italian residents abroad is aged between 18 and 34; a proportion that has 
remained unchanged from before the crisis. Once again, AIRE fi gures prove they 
are not a useful source to understand current outfl ows from Italy, since they include 
not only people who emigrated a long time ago, people born to Italian parents 
abroad, but most of all sizeable amounts of people who were born outside Italy and 
obtained citizenship by descent. According to the latest available data, in fact, 
between 1998 and 2010 at least 1,003,403 individuals got Italian citizenship by 
descent at Italian consulates abroad and were automatically added to the AIRE reg-
istry. 73.3 % of the total new Italian/EU passports were released in Latin American 
countries (Tintori  2009 ,  2012 ).
 At the same time, the ISTAT data too, based on the changes of residence admin-
istrative source, under-estimate the real-time emigration fl ows, since they detect 
only the individuals that offi cially move their abode overseas. However, they still 
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seem to be the best Italian source available to grasp the trends in current emigration. 
According to ISTAT, over 320,000 people left Italy between 2009 and 2012, 40 % 
more than the previous 4 years. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that holds that 
almost exclusively southerners contributed to Italian emigration, the majority of the 
recent emigrants came from the northern regions of Italy. In absolute terms, the larg-
est fl ow of nationals emigrating from Italy in 2012 was to Germany, Switzerland, 
the UK and France. In 2013, for the fi rst time the UK took over as the most favoured 
destination, followed by Germany, Switzerland and France. The data on the 2014 
fl ows confi rm the UK as a booming destination (see also Chap.  10 ). The average age 
was around 34 years old and there was a prevalence of males (57.6 %) over females 
(ISTAT  2014 ). The percentage of graduates on the emigrant population above 25 
years of age has increased from 11.9 % in 2002 to 30.6 % in 2013. The increase of 
graduates among the emigrants is somehow expected, given the high competition 
for jobs in the international labour market, especially in the destination countries 
privileged by Italian graduates. The top fi ve countries that attracted the highest per-
centage of highly educated Italians were, in 2013, the US (35 %), UK (33.9 %), 
Brazil (32.2 %), Switzerland (30.7 %), Spain (30.3 %). There is therefore a growing 
trend of graduates leaving the country, but the share is still by far a minority of the 
emigrant population. In the second part of the chapter, we will analyse better 
whether Italy is currently affected by a “brain drain” or not (Table  4.1 ).
4.1.3.1  Main Destination Countries 
 As showed, according to ISTAT, the largest fl ow of nationals emigrating from Italy 
in 2013 was to the UK (almost 14,000) followed by Germany (11,400), Switzerland 
and France (around 8000–9000 to each country). In all those countries, between 
2010 and 2013, the rise of emigration fl ow from Italy was the fastest since the mid- 
1990s. Once again, data should be taken as a source to grasp the magnitude or trends 
of current emigration, not as a source of precise information. Looking at destination 
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 Fig. 4.1  Italian residents abroad 2006–2013 (Source: AIRE) 
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 For example, if we look at the UK (see Chap.  10 ), according to the AIRE about 
16,000 Italians registered through the local consulates in 2013, but if we consider 
how many Italians obtained a national insurance number (NIN) in the same year, a 
mandatory document that allows to work in the UK, then the fi gure rises to about 
44,000. In 2013 the numbers of NIN allocated to Italians was 66 % higher than in 
the previous year, the largest increase since data is available. The annual infl ow of 
registration is four times higher than its pre-crisis levels. Over 80 % of the Italian 
that were allocated a NIN in 2013 were below 34 years old. Forty-two percent were 
aged between 18 and 24, The NIN data, though, incorporate also Italians only by 
passport, that never actually lived in Italy, mostly Latin Americans of Italian descent 
that use the Italian nationality to enter the EU labour market freely (Tintori  2011 ). 
According to the UK census of 2011, in fact, nearly 10 % of the UK residents hold-
ing an Italian passport were born in Latin America. Moreover, the NIN registration 
is mandatory for temporary and seasonal work too and it is valid for life. Therefore 
the numbers cannot be used to assume the actual stock of Italians living in the UK 
and do not tell us much about the length of their stay. On the other side, the NIN 
registrations do not include Italian people that are not working in the country and 
yet live there. 
 In Germany the stock of Italians increased in 2013 at its fastest rate since the 
1970s. Over 80 % of Italians (excluding students) living in Germany in 2012 had a 
degree in secondary/higher education. According to Swiss national statistics the 
infl ow of Italian immigrants was at its peak in 1983, when it reached 12,000 people, 
it was below 7000 people per year in the decade to 2006, but then it jumped again 
and reached a record high in 2013 with over 13,000 Italian immigrants. This means 
that nearly 80,000 Italians offi cially entered Switzerland with a status of permanent 
 Table 4.1  % of Italian resident population (15–64) and emigrants (25–64) by educational 
attainment, 2002–2013 
 Resident population 
(15–64)  Italian emigrants (25–64) 




(%)  Tertiary (%) 
 2002  8.6  51  37.1  11.9 
 2003  9.1  51.4  36.8  11.8 
 2004  10  56.4  31.4  12.2 
 2005  10.7  51.5  31.1  17.4 
 2006  11.4  50.4  29  20.6 
 2007  12  41.7  33.2  25.1 
 2008  12.7  40.6  33.5  25.9 
 2009  12.8  42.6  33.6  23.8 
 2010  13  38.3  34.8  26.9 
 2011  13.1  37.9  34.5  27.6 
 2012  13.8  36  36.4  27.6 
 2013  14.4  34.6  34.8  30.6 
 Source: ISTAT and Eurostat 
4 Emigration from Italy After the Crisis
56
resident in the 7 years to 2013 compared to half that size in the previous 7 years. To 
these fi gures, we should also add at least 60,000 so-called ‘ frontalieri ’ – Italian 
cross-border workers – who every weekday commute for work between the two 
countries. Even if we look at less favoured destination countries, Italian emigration 
appears to be on the rise. In Austria, immigration from Italy grew a 35 % in 2012 
over the previous year, the fastest rate since consistent data were made available in 
2002. The share of Italian immigrants aged 15–29 years old increased by 6 % points 
to 49 % between 2008 and 2013. In the Netherlands there is a similar rise of Italian 
immigration during the years of the crisis, especially of young people. Immigration 
data from other countries confi rm the described trend too (Table  4.2 ).
 An interesting exception is Belgium. Belgium recorded a long-term decline in 
Italian immigration that has not stopped during the years of the crisis, even if it is 
slightly milder. This is the result of two factors: a reduction in the infl ux of Italians 
since the 1980s – the net Italian migration fl ow is currently about even; and rising 
numbers of acquisition of Belgian nationality, which is automatic to third genera-
tion children. Despite the decline, though, Italians – together with the French – are 
still the largest foreign population in Belgium with over 150,000 individuals (Vause 
 2013 ; see Chap.  7 ). 
 Table 4.2  Stock and % annual change of Italian residents in Germany, Switzerland, Austria, 
Belgium, 2001–2013 



























 2001  616,282  313,976  −1.8  195,586 
 2002  609,784  −1.1  308,255  −1.8  1364  190,792  −2.5 
 2003  601,258  −1.4  303,770  −1.5  1461  7.1  187,021  −2.0 
 2004  548,194  −8.8  300,214  −1.2  1402  −4.0  183,021  −2.1 
 2005  540,810  −1.3  296,392  −1.3  1380  −1.6  179,015  −2.2 
 2006  534,657  −1.1  291,684  −1.6  1467  6.3  175,498  −2.0 
 2007  528,318  −1.2  289,589  −0.7  1713  16.8  171,918  −2.0 
 2008  523,162  −1.0  290,020  0.1  1842  7.5  169,027  −1.7 
 2009  517,474  −1.1  289,111  −0.3  1955  6.1  166,956  −1.2 
 2010  517,546  0.0  289,125  0.0  2167  10.8  165,052  −1.1 
 2011  520,159  0.5  290,546  0.5  2297  6.0  162,826  −1.3 
 2012  529,417  1.8  294,359  1.3  3095  34.7  159,727  −1.9 
 2013  552,943  4.4  301,254  2.3  157,426  −1.4 
 Source: Statistical offi ce of Germany, Switzerland, Austria and Belgium 
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4.2  Policies and Debates 
 The Italian State has traditionally looked at the emigrants and their descendants as 
commercial and economic outlets and a key instrument for promoting its political 
role in the international arena (Tintori  2013 : 143–146). Even during the period of 
the so-called ‘Great Emigration’ at the turn of the twentieth century and again dur-
ing the second wave of mass emigration after World War II, when Italians were 
leaving by the millions per decade, the concern about the ‘haemorrhage’ of eco-
nomically active population was short-lived. It was quickly replaced by the argu-
ment that saw emigration as a safety valve to deal with unemployment and a prospect 
to establish ‘colonies’ of consumers of Italian products abroad. More ambitiously, 
the presence of an Italian diaspora was exploited to project the nation’s prestige, 
economy and labour market internationally (Manzotti  1962 ; Choate  2008 ; Tintori 
and Colucci  2015 ). 
 In terms of policy response, the Italian State has historically displayed a high 
degree of activism in promoting tailor made measures for the citizens abroad and 
their descendants. Since the 1970s – to consider the post-war period only – the insti-
tutions involved ranged from local level administrations – e.g.  Regioni and  Comuni – 
to governmental departments – e.g. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, of Labour, of the 
Interior, of the Economy – and ad hoc created public agencies. Provisions varied 
between economic incentives to return, welfare and pension schemes provided 
directly abroad, training and educational programs, Italian language schools abroad, 
and climaxed in 2000–2001 with the adoption of the legislation on external voting 
that allocated 18 dedicated seats for the external citizens in representation of 4 
global electoral macro-districts (Tintori  2013 : 140–143; Lafl eur  2013 : 78–87). In a 
context of continuity, it is therefore noteworthy to assess whether there has been a 
shift in the contents and intensity of the Italian State’s activities dedicated to the citi-
zens abroad since 2008, as a response to the increase in the outfl ows of the recent 
years. 
4.2.1  Public Discourse After the Crisis 
 As the fi rst section showed, between 1990 and 2014, with the exception of the 
2002–2004 period, the net migration rate of Italian citizens has been negative. This 
means that, even though its dimension waxed and waned, emigration, already main-
streamed into the narrative of the nation, has not ceased to be a permanent trait of 
the Italian society, economy and culture. Three main interwoven public discourses 
dominated the debate regarding recent emigration. 
 The fi rst, up to the crisis, was mainly proposed by some experts and academics 
and was quickly adopted in media representations and descriptive, mostly autobio-
graphical essays (Altreitalie  2011 ; Cucchiarato  2010 ; Soffi ci  2014 ). It described the 
recent migratory waves as the so-called  nuove mobilità (“new mobility”), in order 
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to mark the distance from the mass emigration of the past, in that the latter featured 
humble, unskilled, poorly educated individuals and families forced to leave the 
country out of sheer misery, with nothing but cardboard suitcases, relying on the 
chain migration system to fi nd a job at destination; while the former resonates much 
more with the population of the so-called “Eurostars” (Favell  2008 ), a generation of 
highly skilled and intensely mobile people who are equipped to roam between 
“Eurocities” and global capitals to make the best out of the “human face” of global-
ization (Favell et al.  2006 ). 
 The second, prominent especially after the crisis and the growth in emigration 
rates, was a further development of the fi rst with a note of pessimism added to it. It 
is still pivoted on the young and talented, the highly skilled, the graduates, the “best 
of Italy” (Tirabassi and Del Prà  2014 ), who would be forced – rather than choose – 
to leave the country in growing numbers, since Italy is ruled by the elderly and they 
are not offered anything but fi xed-term contracts, unrewarding career-prospects, and 
peanuts-paid jobs. Members of the political elites contributed to this narrative 
through public statements that prompted nationwide discussions on the ‘brain 
drain’. For example, in November 2009, Pier Luigi Celli, the dean of the Rome- 
based private University LUISS, funded by the association of Italian entrepreneurs, 
published an open letter to his son on one of the leading newspapers,  La Repubblica , 
in which he advised him to leave the country as soon as he graduated. 3 By the same 
token, Fabrizio Barca, then minister of Mario Monti’s government, declared in 2012 
that leaving the country was the right choice for young graduates, citing the exam-
ple of two out of three of his sons that had started a career in Latin America and in 
the UK. 4 As a result, this explicit, almost exclusive focus on talent and emigration 
of graduates through the media, popular blogs 5 and the political elites, has popular-
ized the phrase ‘ fuga dei cervelli ’ – the Italian equal for brain drain –, which is 
applied indiscriminately to every (relatively) young Italian who goes overseas, 
regardless of their qualifi cation and occupation. 
 This only partially true and extremely over-simplistic rendition of Italy’s current 
mobility patterns, even in the academic realm, relies essentially on qualitative and 
human-centred empirical research that samples on the dependent variable. It does 
not delve into the actual data on the human capital of those who leave, their occupa-
tion, wage levels, type of job contracts, and length of stay abroad. As we have only 
started to demonstrate in the fi rst part of the chapter, though, if there is enough 
evidence to state that the recent rise of emigration – especially that undetected by 
Italian offi cial data – was signifi cantly composed of young people, there are no solid 
3  Pier Luigi Celli, “Figlio mio, lascia questo Paese”,  La Repubblica , 30 November 2009.  http://
www.repubblica.it/2009/11/sezioni/scuola_e_universita/servizi/celli-lettera/celli-lettera/celli-let-
tera.html ; last accessed 13 August 2014. 
4  “Barca: ‘Fuga di cervelli? Se Italia non migliora è giusta’”,  La Repubblica , 16 April 2012,  http://
www.repubblica.it/scienze/2012/04/16/…/barca_fuga_di_cervelli_se_italia_non_migliora_
giusta‐33394354/ ; last accessed 17 April 2014. 
5 Among the most popular blogs are  Italians by Beppe Severgnini, journalist of one of the most 
important Italian newspapers,  Il Corriere della Sera , and  Giovani Talenti (Young talents) hosted by 
Sergio Nava, journalist of the main economic Italian newspaper  Il Sole 24Ore . 
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proofs that they bring the ‘brain’ too with them, as they are not necessarily skilled 
or they don’t necessarily end up working in highly-skilled sectors. In the next and 
fi nal section, we will add a few more words on the issue, by looking at the data on 
the human capital of those who have left or might leave. 
 Third discourse: the principal Italian daily newspapers, the liberal  La Repubblica 
and the moderate  Il Corriere della Sera , have joined the ‘brain drain frenzy’ and 
feature regular contributions, in their online versions especially, that spotlight the 
‘haemorrhage’ of the best part of the population. 6 This kind of reportages has often 
been associated to the diffi culties that Italy faces in integrating her immigrants. 
Probably an unintended outcome, the alarmed tones characterizing these discourses 
have led to a political climate where an ‘Italians fi rst’ argument and an anti- 
immigrant backlash have become politically legitimate, even more so in the context 
of growing competition for jobs. Thus, not only the traditionally anti-immigrant 
campaigns of the Northern League are now recrudescing, but also the minister of 
the Interior, Angelino Alfano, member of the broad coalition government led by 
Matteo Renzi, recently declared that the government will not allow that even “a 
single immigrant take the job of an Italian citizen”. 7 
4.2.2  Political Initiatives 
 The long-standing dynamism of the Italian state towards the ‘Italians abroad’, a 
phrase that indistinctly confl ates both the emigrants and the descendants of former 
emigrants, makes it diffi cult to single out which policies and/or agencies have been 
developed as a reaction to the growth of outfl ows after the crisis. In addition, in the 
course of – even recent – history, a plethora of institutions have been in charge to 
deal with the ‘Italians abroad’. In this section, we provide a fi rst review of the mea-
sures undertaken since 2008. We examine whether there has been a shift in the 
contents and intensity of the governmental activities towards the emigrants, if these 
measures are dependable on the described public discourses that accompanied the 
recent outfl ows, and whether they are consistent with the available data on ‘those 
who leave’, Italy’s economic situation and labour market. 
 Since the 1990s, and even more intensely between 2000 and 2007, virtually all 
of the 20 Italian regional administrations passed legislative acts that reached out for 
their reference communities of ‘Italians abroad’. Provisions encompassed a wide 
range of policies: social subsidies, vocational training and co-development projects, 
programmes aimed at facilitating ‘co-ethnic’ returns, cultural exchange trips, tour-
ism, and so forth. After the crisis, a minority of experts and politicians, especially 
6  See, for example, the ad hoc created video-reportage format  Domicilio Londra (Domicile: 
London) by  La Repubblica :  http://video.repubblica.it/rubriche/domicilio-londra 
7  “Alfano: ‘Non accetteremo che un immigrato prenda il posto di un italiano’,  La Repubblica , 1 
August 2014,  http://www.repubblica.it/politica/2014/08/01/news/alfano_-92937945/ ; last access 2 
August 2014. 
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those with an academic background, assuming a high degree of return or circularity 
of the current outfl ows have tried to frame the ‘Italians abroad’ question mainly as 
an opportunity and not necessarily as a problem, a potential occasion to further 
develop the labour force’s human capital, improve the balance of trade and of pay-
ments, and a chance to transform the ‘brain drain’ into a ‘brain return’ (ISPI  2012 ). 
A more systematic study is still needed, but it seems that more recently the main 
efforts of both state-level agencies and local administrations have been directed, on 
the one hand, towards the establishment of ethnic business communities and, on the 
other, towards the return of individuals with improved human and social capital. 
 As recently as 30 December 2010, the then Berlusconi’s government approved a 
measure (Law 238) formally aimed at attracting EU skilled citizens to move and 
work in Italy. The law grants tax incentives to EU citizens born after 1969, who have 
been working or have graduated abroad but have resided for at least 2 years in Italy 
in the past. The incentives are accorded if they start new business activities in Italy 
or are hired permanently by an Italian employer. As a matter of fact, the law is pri-
marily targeting Italian nationals, as an attempt to pave the way for the return of the 
skilled and young emigrants. In fact, the measure, which is advertised in Italian 
only, includes a series of ancillary privileges for Italian citizens alone, in terms of 
access to public housing and pension benefi ts. It also creates a privileged bureau-
cratic channel for the Italian applicants in order to speed up their procedures, 
through a collaboration between the Italian consulates and the agency  Italia Lavoro 
SpA , created in 1997 and controlled by the Ministry of the Economy. Incidentally, 
these actions were undertaken concurrently with the adoption of policies that 
retrenched the social and economic rights of third country nationals regularly resid-
ing in Italy and made more demanding the procedures to get their residence permits 
renewed. 
 The 2010 Law and the hegemonic narrative on the ‘brain drain’ became the foun-
dation of ensuing actions taken both at the local and state level. The Umbria region 
has launched the programme ‘Brain Back Umbria’, which further develops its 
Regional Law 37 of 1997. The programme, fi nanced mainly through the European 
Social Fund, focuses exclusively on former residents of the region living abroad. It 
grants tax incentives for new businesses and start-ups set up in the region, as well as 
seed money – 5000 Euros – for researchers. 8 Similarly, the municipality of Milan 
has launched the portal “Welcome Talent”, in cooperation with the blog  Italents and 
few local scholars. The programme, through the action called “Welcome Business”, 
allocated 510,000 Euros to ‘talented returnees’ in order to start a new business in 
Milan. In 2012, under Monti’s government, the Ministry of the Interior and the 
Ministry of Education activated the platform “Innovitalia” whose goal is to “maxi-
mise the impact of human capital” of the Italian “brains” abroad and “promote 
research and business opportunities” in partnership with the motherland. 9 
 These actions are certainly consistent with the hegemonic narratives concerning 
the current emigration, where both the governmental rhetoric and media reports 
8  http://www.brainbackumbria.eu/index.php last access 12 August 2014. 
9  http://www.innovitalia.net/crowdforce/product/index.html last access 12 August 2014. 
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insist on the presence of graduates. Yet, the available data show that the percentage 
of graduates, though on the increase, is by far a minority not only in the stock but 
also in the yearly emigrant population. 
 In some respects, Italy presents all the prerequisites for suffering from a ‘brain 
drain’ issue. Education did not help much to avoid economic distress. Unemployment 
rates among those with a tertiary education were about 11.5 % of the young popula-
tion (25–34 years old) in 2011, an even larger proportion than among those with 
secondary education (10.5 %) and not so smaller than the unemployment rate of 
those without education (14.8 %). In other countries, university degrees are much 
more rewarding in terms of employability. For example, in Germany youth unem-
ployment rates drop from 20 % among those with no qualifi cation to 2.7 % among 
those with a tertiary degree. France shows a similar gap (23 % vs. 6 %) and even in 
Spain where unemployment rates are higher, earning a degree makes a decisive dif-
ference in the labour market (33 % with no qualifi cation vs. 16 % among graduates) 
(OECD  2013a ). 
 On the other hand, comparative studies show that Italy does not export more 
graduates than other developed countries – in the EU, for example, Germany, France 
and the UK have higher percentages of graduates leaving the country – but has 
instead a problem of ‘brain circulation’, in that it is not able to attract signifi cant 
numbers of educated foreigners (Franzoni et al.  2012 ; Beltrame  2007 ). The asym-
metric treatment reserved to the ‘Italians abroad’ and third country nationals in the 
allocation of rights and access to incentives might play a decisive role here. In addi-
tion, Italy might not export many graduates as expected simply because, fi rst, there 
are not so many and, second, they may not be necessarily fi t to participate in the 
global labour market. Italy ranked second to last for tertiary educational attainment 
among all OECD countries – only Turkey had worse rates – regardless of whether 
the whole population was considered or only the youth cohort (25–34 years old) 
(OECD  2013b ). By the same token, in 2013 Italy scored poorly, last place among 20 
OECD countries, for percentage of adults (aged 16–65) who worked in skilled 
occupations during the previous 5 years (OECD  2013c : 442). Enrico Giovannini, 
then minister of Labour in Letta’s government, commenting on these data, bitterly 
observed that the average poor human capital of most of the Italian young people 
made them simply unemployable, when it came to the demands of the international 
labour market. 10 
 Italian consulates have probably a better pulse of the kind of emigration that is 
taking place from Italy. Massimiliano Mazzanti, the Italian consul in London, con-
fi rmed that the UK is a booming destination for Italians looking for a job. Their 
profi les and qualifi cations vary extensively, but only a minority ends up working in 
the City or in highly skilled occupations. As a matter of fact, a growing number of 
scams have been reported, in which Italian newcomers are requested payment for 
10  “Giovannini su dati Ocse: ‘Dimostrano che italiani poco occupabili’”,  La Repubblica , 9 October 
2013,  http://www.repubblica.it/scuola/2013/10/09/news/giovannini_su_dati_ocse_dimostrano_
che_italiani_poco_occupabili-68246867/ last access 12 August 2014. 
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accommodation and access to work by fellow citizens and locals 11 – a sort of his-
toric recurrence of the ethnic-broker or  padrone system that accompanied Italy’s 
great emigration of the past. That is why the consulate, in January 2014, launched 
the “Primo Approdo” (First Landing) project, which offers a downloadable hand-
book as well as in person meetings with experts to provide young Italians with 
information on how the labour market, the educational, social, health and legal sys-
tems function in the UK. Even more recently, the Italian consulate in Melbourne has 
hosted a photographic exhibition at the local  Museo Italiano , signifi cantly titled 
 What I have to do / What I would like to do , by Cristian Iotti. The exhibit witnesses 
the stories of many young Italians who have recently arrived in Australia and have 
adapted to all kind of occupations in order to make a living, while still pursuing their 
individual dream-job. 
4.3  Conclusion 
 There is a clear and growing trend of Italians emigrating from the country after the 
economic crisis. The fi gure on emigration of 2014, the highest since the mid-1970s, 
counts for 1.4 emigrants for every 1000 of the Italian population. As described in 
the fi rst section of the chapter, numbers, composition, profi le and duration of the 
most recent and current outfl ows from the country are still somehow uncertain. Yet, 
they are undoubtedly not comparable in size – both in absolute and relative num-
bers – with mass departures of the two waves of the historical great emigration. 
There are enough data to affi rm that it is mostly the young to emigrate, as it is usu-
ally the case, but there is no solid evidence yet to assert that the majority are also 
highly-skilled or – educated. Partially, emigration of the young is due to the 
increased movements of people in a globally interconnected labour market. But the 
most likely explanations to account for the increase in the emigration rate after the 
crisis should be sought in the combined effect of two factors: the long period of 
sluggish or no growth of the economy since the 1990s, which has progressively 
impoverished the country’s household incomes, and the latest labour market 
reforms, that between 2003, with the law n. 276 of 20 September, and 2012, with the 
law n. 92 of 8 June, – the so-called Biagi and Fornero Laws, respectively – have 
heavily deregulated the labour market and introduced fl exibility. The reforms, in 
particular, have a direct responsibility in pushing young people out of the country, 
since they have aggravated the labour system’s segmentation, in which a relevant 
part of Italy’s workforce, with a majority of males and members of the older genera-
tions, holds hyper-protected life-long contracts, while a sizeable minority, virtually 
all of the new employed, has access almost exclusively to insecure, highly-fl exible, 
low-paid jobs (Berton et al.  2012 ; Simoni  2009 ). There where more detailed data on 
11  “Interview with Italian Consul in London, Massimiliano Mazzanti”,  L ’ ItaloEuropeo , 21 February 
2014,  http://www.italoeuropeo.com/interviews/1539-interview-with-italian-consul-in-london-massim-
iliano-mazzanti last access 12 August 2014. 
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the occupation of current Italian emigrants are available and as testifi ed by recent 
initiatives undertaken by the Italian consular authorities, the hegemonic narratives 
focussed on the ‘brain drain’ issue and the export of talents appear to be misleading. 
They should, at best, speak of ‘brain waste’. In fact, on the national labour market 
front, Italy is not able to participate in the brain circulation system and attract a 
number of skilled immigrants suffi cient to match the relatively average percentage 
of her graduates and PhDs that are leaving. It does not reward adequately the young 
and educated either, who are very often confi ned to unattractive careers, underpaid 
and underemployed. On the international labour market front, Italian adults lack the 
key skills to compete with their peers, constantly ranking in the last place in Europe 
in terms of foreign languages, numeracy and ICT profi ciency (OECD  2013c ). 
Despite these evidences, the public discourse on emigration has adopted quite 
alarmed tones, since it has focused primarily on the ‘brain drain’ issue. More wor-
ryingly, it has become a fi eld where to display ethno-nationalist arguments and anti- 
immigrant backlash. 
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